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The Fairness Doctrine, one of the most famous and controversial media policies ever 
enacted, suffered a final deathblow in August 2011 when the Federal Communications 
Commission permanently struck it from the books. However, the Doctrine continues to be 
invoked by proponents and detractors alike. Using mixed methods, this study historically 
contextualizes the Fairness Doctrine while drawing attention to how it figures within 
contemporary regulatory debates. By tracing over time the shifting ideologies and 
discourses surrounding the Fairness Doctrine, we can see how political conflict shapes the 
normative foundations of core media policies, especially those involving positive freedoms. 
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The 2016 election drew considerable scrutiny to the American news media’s role in facilitating 
Donald Trump’s candidacy, especially related to imbalances in covering the presidential candidates and their 
policy positions (Patterson, 2016), and the commercial imperatives driving such coverage (Pickard, 2017b). 
Some analysts have suggested (Cushion, 2016; Pickard, 2017b) that one contributing factor was a lack of 
public interest protections that can offset news media’s commercial excesses—protections such as the long-
defunct Fairness Doctrine, one of the most famous and controversial media policies ever enacted in the 
United States. 
 
The Fairness Doctrine’s longer history, especially its origins in the 1940s, is generally not well 
known. To the extent that it does persist in public memory, it is often conflated with the “equal time” rule 
for political candidates. But the Doctrine’s purpose was more progressive than simply requiring two sides to 
a debate: It stipulated that broadcasters must cover controversial issues of public importance in ways that 
presented opposing views. Today, the first half (arguably the more progressive clause) of the Fairness 
Doctrine––a mandate to air public issues of interest––is often conveniently overlooked in favor of the 
mandate to air opposing positions. Although the Fairness Doctrine’s effectiveness and enforceability are 
debatable, it encouraged sensitivity toward programming biases and provided local communities an 
important tool with which to hold broadcasters accountable. Now officially erased from the rules, we can 
reflect on the decades-long saga of this oft-maligned and misunderstood doctrine. Doing so brings into focus 
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a number of historical contradictions in America’s approach to media policy, and it underscores the shifting 
normative foundations and discourses regarding positive freedoms. 
 
Positive Freedoms’ Complicated Legacy in American Media Policy 
 
Drawing from Isaiah Berlin’s (1969) classic essay, we can understand discourses around free 
speech as emphasizing either negative liberties (“freedom from”) or positive ones (“freedom to”). In the 
United States, freedom of speech has historically been framed in negative terms, exemplified by the First 
Amendment (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press”). This 
emphasis on negative rights has impoverished American policy debates regarding individual and collective 
speech rights and has disproportionately benefited the rights of media corporations rather than the public 
(Pickard, 2015a). But important—and often overlooked—traditions exist that instead draw on a positive 
rights discourse (Huntsberger, 2014; Pickard, 2016), especially within international discourses (Harvey, 
1998; Jones, 2001; Kenyon, 2014). For example, Article 19 of the United Nations Declaration of Human 
Rights codifies the right to “receive and impart information and ideas through any media.” Even within the 
largely negative-liberty U.S. policy discourse, important exceptions exist, like the Supreme Court’s 1945 
Associated Press case, which argued that the First Amendment “rests on the assumption that the widest 
possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of 
the public” (Associated Press v. United States, 1945). 
 
The Fairness Doctrine stands out as another important exception, though its history holds a number 
of surprising ironies. Many contemporary reformists hold up the policy as the pinnacle of enlightened 
governance, and some advocate to “bring back the Fairness Doctrine” (Holm, 2014). However, most postwar 
progressives wished to retain a stronger regulation that forbade broadcasters from politically editorializing—
what was known as the “Mayflower Doctrine.” To many 1940s reformers, the public interest obligation that 
replaced the Mayflower rule—what would later become known as the Fairness Doctrine—was a kind of 
consolation prize for losing a more meaningful constraint on commercial broadcasters’ power. Nonetheless, 
the Doctrine ultimately led to significant progressive victories, such as revoking a racist broadcaster’s license 
in the WLBT television case (Horwitz, 1997), and the Red Lion Supreme Court case (1969), in which the 
justices declared that the audience’s rights to information outweighed broadcasters’ freedom of speech. 
 
These important victories notwithstanding, the Fairness Doctrine’s often-romanticized legacy 
should be reconsidered in light of its postwar origins, one marked by conflict, ambivalence, and contingency. 
The following analysis begins this revisionist project and concludes with a discussion of the contemporary 
implications of the Doctrine’s demise. It shows how it represents an exemplar of positive freedom enshrined 
in media policy. Tracing activists’ and political elites’ shifting views of the Doctrine reveals the conflicting 
paradigms of American media policy, especially as they connect with shifting discourses, ideologies, and 
power relationships. 
 
Therefore, this article has two overlapping objectives, one historical and one theoretical. The first 
argument traces out the long political history of the Fairness Doctrine, giving particular attention to its little-
known origins in the late 1940s. The second argument links this history to shifting normative foundations 
in American media policy—namely, the erosion of positive freedoms. Various aspects of this analysis can be 
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found within a vast and scattered literature, but it has not yet been synthesized to include the early historical 
debates, nor has this long history been adequately contextualized within our contemporary moment. 
 
Previous Scholarship on the Fairness Doctrine 
 
A complete inventory of the vast Fairness Doctrine scholarship exceeds the scope of this article, 
but a nod toward representative studies gives a sense of its contours. Discussions that focus on its political 
history are dispersed across many law journals (e.g., Ammori, 2008; Barron, 1961; Hall, 1994; Lloyd, 
2008), and useful reappraisals have emerged periodically (e.g., Raphael, 2005; Rowan, 1984). Previous 
scholars have looked at the rhetoric and political campaigns behind its repeal (Smith, 1999), with some 
analyses placing its demise in broader political economic relationships (Harvey, 1998) and public-interest-
oriented policy contexts (Aufderheide, 1990). One of the most authoritative accounts is that by Simmons 
(1978), and Fred Friendly provided useful historical background in his book The Good Guys, the Bad Guys, 
and the First Amendment (1975). 
 
Little research has examined the Fairness Doctrine’s contemporary implications, but it is beginning 
to receive renewed attention. For example, an insightful article by Allison Perlman (2012) provides a 
thorough treatment of the Doctrine’s recent history by examining its intersections with issues of diversity, 
conservative rhetoric, and the politics of media policy. In particular, she found that conservatives 
successfully reframed the debate over the Doctrine as a liberal attempt to silence right-wing voices instead 
of a means of addressing preexisting structural inequities, specifically those surrounding questions of race. 
Lefevre-Gonzalez (2013) used the Doctrine as a gauge for shifting arguments around definitions of the 
“public interest,” particularly how its use varies in different historical contexts. More recently, Clogston 
(2016) conducted interviews of key players around the Doctrine’s late history, Montalbano (2018) traced 
historical parallels between the Doctrine and net neutrality, and Zelizer (2017) combined a synthesis of 
secondary literature with some primary documentation from the Reagan papers to highlight the political 
interventions driving the Doctrine’s repeal in the 1980s. 
 
Little scholarship addresses the Fairness Doctrine’s historical origins in the 1940s. One notable 
exception is a dissertation that describes public engagement during its early debates (Toro, 2000). 
Observing that the political backdrop to the Doctrine has been largely overlooked, Toro showed how public 
groups were deeply involved with media policy debates at this time, and various public pressures were 
decidedly against the policy outcome that led to the Doctrine. My previous work suggests that the Doctrine’s 
origins should be understood in the context of a waning 1940s media reform movement, concluding a decade 
of progressive policy interventions (Pickard, 2015a). 
 
Despite this earlier research, existing scholarship, as well as contemporary policy debates, would 
benefit from a deeper understanding of the Fairness Doctrine’s long historical trajectory. This history spans 
from early policy debates in the 1940s to contemporary contexts in which the Doctrine continues to be 
invoked. The following discussion builds on my earlier historical research to provide a theoretical and 
historical overview of the Doctrine’s inception and its evolution over six decades. It concludes with a 
discussion of the Doctrine’s continuing significance, especially its implications for positive freedoms within 
media policy discourse. 
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Methods 
 
Drawing from a theoretical framework that combines historical institutionalism (Skocpol, 1995) and 
democratic theory (Berlin, 1969), I used a multimethod mix of qualitative approaches to underscore the 
political origins of policy initiatives, with an eye toward path dependencies. In particular, I rely on historical 
methods that included in-depth archival research of activist literature, memos, letters, and personal papers 
connected to individuals and groups that participated in broadcast policy debates in the 1940s. Drawing 
from materials I gathered for earlier research, I gave close attention to Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) records. Much of this research focused on Clifford Durr’s personal papers, which are held at the 
Alabama state archives in Montgomery. 
 
I also consulted the James Lawrence (Larry) Fly papers at Columbia University; the Dallas Smythe 
papers at Simon Fraser University; and the FCC papers at the National Archives at College Park, Maryland. 
These policy makers were among the leading architects of a social democratic policy vision at the FCC during 
the 1940s (Pickard, 2017a), particularly in their work on the FCC Blue Book, which attempted to codify a 
progressive conception of the broadcasters “public interest” mandate (Pickard, 2011). These individuals’ 
personal communications provide a lens through which we can understand the intellectual formations and 
dueling ideologies surrounding the Fairness Doctrine. In addition to these personal communications, I draw 
from archival materials such as transcripts of the public testimony regarding the repeal of the Mayflower 
Doctrine, which directly led to the Fairness Doctrine. I also closely examined a wide range of policy 
documents, such as FCC reports, that shed light on how power relationships operate through policy 
discourses. 
 
For more recent accounts, I examined political news coverage, especially from trade press 
publications, including Ars Technica and Broadcasting & Cable during the years of 2008–9, when there was 
a sudden renewed interest in the Fairness Doctrine. I also worked in Washington, DC during this time at a 
public policy think tank and a media reform organization; therefore, participant observations from attending 
meetings with public interest advocates and policy makers also inform my analysis. More recently, I have 
gathered news accounts, especially from conservative sources, that link the Doctrine with policy 
interventions such as net neutrality. I also spoke to Ralph Nader about his involvement in debates around 
the Fairness Doctrine in the 1970s and 1980s and discussed with him whether the Doctrine is still relevant 
today. 
 
I interpreted the meaning and significance of historical and contemporary documents to flesh out 
how power operates through policy texts and ultimately how discursive boundaries are constructed and 
reproduced. Based on a critical discourse analysis (Van Dijk, 1993), I took historical and contextual factors 
into consideration as I interrogated recurring themes, contradictions, and tensions. Scholars are increasingly 
using discourse analysis to examine media policy (see, e.g., a 2014 special issue of Communication, Culture 
& Critique devoted to media policy discourse), but there are still relatively few blueprints from which to 
draw, although arguably the method has been used by previous media scholars without being referred to 
specifically as such (e.g., Streeter, 1983). Discourse analysis, Howarth noted (2000), focuses on language, 
but also on the conditions under which discourses are created and contested. This approach is particularly 
useful for understanding how media policies change over time. As discussed in the following sections, 
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competing discourses about broadcast media’s normative role in a democratic society—and the legitimacy 
of government to regulate that relationship—have been evident since the 1930s and 1940s. 
 
Sinking the Mayflower Doctrine 
 
Although the fairness norm stems from a liberal “marketplace of ideas” notion, a more libertarian 
ethos governed radio speech during commercial radio’s earliest years.1 Yet, legislative doctrine contained a 
concept of fairness at least since the public interest clause in the 1927 Federal Radio Commission’s language. 
Moreover, laissez-faire approaches to broadcast policy were problematized as fascism ascended during the 
1930s, and homegrown reactionaries like Father Coughlin used the public airwaves to generate large 
followings. Strong political positions also were potentially bad for business if they scared off advertisers, 
and the 1939 NAB code encouraged broadcasters to adopt a no-editorializing policy. The code even 
foreshadowed the Fairness Doctrine by obliging broadcasters to present to the public questions of a 
controversial nature (Toro, 2000). 
 
Other debates that provided important context for the Mayflower Rule were two 1930s cases, the 
Brinkley case (an infamous “goat gland doctor” who was seen as threatening public health) and the Shuler 
case (an inflammatory preacher whose sermons accused public officials of corruption). These broadcasters 
had their licenses revoked on public interest grounds (Powe, 1987). These cases determined whether 
denying someone a right to speak over the public airwaves (a public interest consideration) was tantamount 
to violating their freedom of speech (a First Amendment concern). The Federal Radio Commission (the 
precursor to the FCC) and the courts found that these interventions did not violate First Amendment 
freedoms, which helped establish precedents in 1930s broadcasting policy that privileged the rights of 
listeners over broadcasters’ speech concerns. Nonetheless, debates around such interventions evidenced 
ongoing tensions around positive freedoms, and such policies that erred on the side of listeners’ rights ran 
up against commercial broadcasters’ business prerogatives and profit imperatives. 
 
The original Mayflower decision emerged in the late 1930s during the renewal process of the station 
Yankee Network, Inc. After it became evident that the station had broadcasted its owners’ editorial views, 
the FCC responded by clarifying its stance against editorializing. Given radio’s “limitations in frequencies,” 
the FCC declared that “the public interest can never be served by a dedication” to a broadcaster’s “own partisan 
ends” (FCC, 1940, p. 340). The FCC was particularly concerned over whether broadcasters could attack any 
person or position at will without offering opportunities to reply by those who were maligned. Arguing that 
democratic radio depended on “fairly and objectively presented” ideas, the Commission asserted, “A truly free 
radio cannot be used to advocate the causes of the licensees . . . [or] support the candidates of his friends . . 
. [or support] principles he happens to regard most favorably”; it concluded that “the broadcaster cannot be 
advocate” (FCC, 1940, p. 340). The FCC’s Mayflower decision essentially alerted all broadcasters that one-
sided editorializing would not be permitted. 
 
                                               
1 Parts of the following two sections draw from research discussed in more detail in Pickard (2015a, pp. 98–
123). 
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The subsequent 1943 Supreme Court decision in National Broadcasting Co. (NBC) v. United States 
furthered clarified that the FCC’s powers to regulate broadcasters’ public interest obligations extended into 
programming-related issues. Significantly, it determined that a denial of a license to a broadcaster failing 
to adhere to content requirements was not a denial of free speech. This arrangement, however, created 
quandaries for the FCC since the agency was loath to constantly police radio programming. FCC 
Commissioner Clifford Durr, the leading progressive on the Commission during much of the Mayflower 
Doctrine debates, privately acknowledged as much when he argued that it was broadcasters’ responsibility 
to uphold these norms. But he also believed that station owners must demonstrate that they did not just 
promote their own views and exclude others. Nonetheless, Durr conceded that bias always exists in news 
selection and other content-related decisions, and subtle forms of editorializing may emerge (Durr, 1945).  
 
Despite reformers’ efforts to preserve the more aggressive Mayflower Doctrine, what would later 
become known as the Fairness Doctrine represented a compromise. In a concession to widely held concerns 
that giving commercial broadcasters so much political power would lead to one-sided polemics, unchecked 
partisanship, and various commercial excesses, the new doctrine included a consideration of fairness. It 
called for broadcasters to “provide full and equal opportunity for the presentation to the public of all sides 
of public issues” because “the licensee has assumed the obligation of presenting all sides of important public 
questions, fairly, objectively and without bias” (FCC, 1940, p. 340). This wording emphasizes listeners’ 
positive rights to hear a broad spectrum of debate, as opposed to the negative, individual freedoms of the 
speaker/broadcaster. 
 
Finding Fairness 
 
Debates over content regulation were a recurring tension at the FCC, but it was a specific political 
agenda that toppled the Mayflower Doctrine. After broadcasters defeated the Blue Book, which had been 
the FCC’s first real attempt to define broadcasters’ public service responsibilities, they felt emboldened to 
push for the repeal of the no-editorializing rule. Broadcasters framed this rule as an unjustified government 
intrusion that violated their First Amendment rights. In contrast, many progressives sought to preserve the 
rule based on a structural analysis of media power and a positive interpretation of the First Amendment that 
promoted collective freedoms, such as access to a diverse media system. 
 
By mid-1946, rumors began circulating that the rule was being reevaluated. Former FCC Chairman 
Larry Fly, who now represented the ACLU and would fight against repealing the Mayflower Doctrine, was 
alarmed by this news. He wrote to Commissioner Durr, “What is this I read about your replacing the 
Mayflower decision? You scare me!” (Fly, 1946). Durr (1947) was actually fighting to retain the Mayflower 
Doctrine, writing to one ally that the upcoming public hearings on its fate are “as important as any that 
have ever faced this Commission” (personal letter). The broadcast industry, however, was displeased to see 
the Mayflower rule publicly debated, calling the FCC’s invitations to diverse constituencies an “unusual step.” 
Broadcasters’ main argument was that self-regulation would suffice, to which Durr (1948a) responded, 
“‘self-regulation’ inevitably ends up with regulation in the interests of the industry rather than the public” 
(personal letter). 
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The great majority of radio listeners’ letters sent to the FCC at this time were decidedly in favor of 
sustaining strong regulations contained in the Mayflower Doctrine (Brinson, 2004). These pro-Mayflower 
letters typically argued that the FCC should “preserve the intent of the first amendment” (Baegel, 1948, 
personal letter), “protect freedom of expression over the airways . . . of any controversial question” (Kipnis, 
1948), and recognize that “the public owns the air, and [therefore] . . . big business must not control the 
air as it does the press” (Ogborn, 1948, personal letter). A civil rights group’s letter echoed widely-held 
concerns about losing the Mayflower rule: “Nothing would be more tragic,” the letter stated, for it would “let 
loose a flood of libelous and distorted statements leading to violence against individuals and groups fighting 
to maintain the right of collective bargaining and freedom of assemblage.” These groups, including “labor 
organizations, the Negro people, religious bodies and other minorities,” were often “subjected to oppression 
to use the air,” especially given that commercial broadcasters often yielded to the “pressure of Chambers 
of Commerce, the American Legion and such forces” and therefore “close[d] the air to those who would 
answer these attacks” (Salkind, 1948, personal letter). 
 
Although the late 1940s’ broader trajectory was dispiriting for progressive policy reformers, intense 
public engagement during the Mayflower Doctrine debates offered some hope. In a letter to a former 
colleague, Commissioner Durr (1948c) enthused that these debates were “the hot issue” and “encouraging” 
because “public representatives have appeared in quantity . . . [to make] intelligent statements” (personal 
letter). Even after the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) president Justin Miller “move[d] into action 
with his big guns,” as Durr (1948b) described it to the renowned media reformer Everett Parker, he was 
confident that reformers would prevail in the FCC hearings because “the public was so well represented,” 
including radio production people such as writers, producers, musicians, and actors. “Perhaps after all,” Durr 
(1948b) observed, “the people are beginning to wake up to the fact that the air is theirs” (personal letter). 
 
The FCC hearings in the spring of 1948 consisted of 49 witnesses as well as 21 additional 
statements from individuals and groups who were unable to attend in person. Witnesses included 
representatives from many progressive groups, including the American Jewish Committee, the Lawyers 
Guild, the CIO, and the UAW, who all testified in support of the Mayflower Doctrine. Although some pro-
industry voices were included, many witnesses invoked concerns about corporate voices taking over the 
airwaves (Pickard, 2015a). Given the recent purges of liberal radio commentators when a number of leading 
left-of-center personalities were removed from the air, progressives feared the wrath of uncontested right-
wing radio if the rule was discontinued. Indeed, they had good reason to assume that these newly granted 
rights would shirk impartiality and skew conservative. By allowing the market to dictate who gets heard—
effectively censoring some voices from the public discourse—many activist groups feared what would happen 
if commercial broadcasters were given free rein without public interest protections founded in positive 
freedoms. 
 
Throughout the hearings, Charles Siepmann (the FCC Blue Book’s primary author) and other media 
reformers explicitly advocated for positive freedoms that protected listeners’ rights. Siepmann asserted that 
“more is at stake . . . than the right of broadcasters to editorialize” (FCC, 1948, p. 575).  Challenging 
broadcasters’ argument that the FCC’s jurisdiction should be limited to technical concerns, he saw regulatory 
authority over programming whatsoever as the “more fundamental issue” (p. 575) being debated, especially 
regarding the FCC’s legitimacy in protecting positive freedoms. He argued for a “liberty more precious” than 
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broadcasters’ freedom to accumulate wealth: “the freedom of the people to hear all sides of controversial 
issues” so that the public has access to “all that may be learned in the free market of thought” (p. 579-
580). Commercial broadcasters, Siepmann argued, did not share this goal because their “prime interest is 
in profits” (p. 582). Similarly, Henry Fleisher, spokesperson for the CIO (a federation of labor unions), 
testified in “vigorous objection” to weakening the Mayflower Doctrine because doing so would “permit the 
country to be deluged constantly with radio editorials expressing essentially a single viewpoint — that of 
large corporations” (pp. 608-609). 
 
Witnesses in support of repeal, such as NAB president Justin Miller and the veteran broadcast 
attorney Louis Caldwell, emphasized negative freedoms. They argued that any government regulation of 
radio programming amounted to an abridgement of broadcasters’ speech. In his comments before the FCC, 
Miller stated repeatedly that ethical considerations for creating opportunities for expression notwithstanding, 
the First Amendment strictly forbade any such government intervention (FCC, 1948, pp. 832-955). Likewise, 
Caldwell argued that imposing a “fair play doctrine” amounted to censorship, which Congress had 
purposefully forbidden the FCC from doing (p. 1491). However, these were, overall, minority views; many 
witnesses wanted more regulation, not less.  
 
Strong public support for maintaining the ban notwithstanding, the FCC ultimately voted in favor 
of repeal. The lone dissent did not come from Durr, who had left the commission before the final Mayflower 
decision, but from his successor, Frieda Hennock, the first female Commissioner (Brinson, 2002). Hennock 
argued that without a means of “policing and enforcing the requirement that the public trust granted a 
license be exercised in an impartial manner, it seems foolhardy to permit editorialization by licensees 
themselves”; she concluded that “prohibiting [such editorializing] is our only instrument for insuring the 
proper use of radio in the public interest” (FCC, 1949, p. 1270).  
 
When the rule was revoked, the FCC tried to address such concerns by articulating broadcasters’ 
affirmative duties. Although stations could choose their own programming, they must “devote a reasonable 
percentage of their broadcasting time to the discussion of public issues of interest in the community served 
by their stations” (FCC, 1949, p. 1249). Furthermore, these programs must “be designed so that the public 
has a reasonable opportunity to hear different opposing positions on the public issues of interest and 
importance in the community” (FCC, 1949, p. 1250). Assuming that “licensees have an affirmative obligation 
to insure fair presentation of all sides of any controversial issue” (FCC, 1949, p. 1250), the FCC struck a 
middle path by granting broadcasters some flexibility, but mandating overall balance and fairness. 
 
Nonetheless, many reformers saw the decision as an abdication of responsibility. After hearing 
about the decision, the former FCC economist Dallas Smythe (1949), now a University of Illinois 
communications professor, asked his former colleagues if “the Commission has substituted regulation by 
the closed eyelid for regulation by the lifted eyebrow” (personal letter). Broadcasters, on the other hand, 
were very pleased with this decision. Justin Miller addressed the annual NAB convention with the claim that 
revoking the Mayflower Doctrine had led to a florescence of news and commentary across the country. He 
hailed the decision as “the greatest single victory in behalf of freedom of expression in this nation since the 
Zenger case confirming the editorial freedom of newspapers over a century ago” (quoted in “The Mayflower 
Doctrine Scuttled,” 1949, p. 760). 
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Thus, repealing the Mayflower Doctrine capped a truly remarkable trajectory of early radio policy. 
Only after failing to establish significant swathes of the spectrum for nonprofit radio in the 1930s 
(McChesney, 1993) did reformers focus on regulating broadcasters’ political speech. And only after 
broadcasters won the right to editorialize did reformers begin to settle for mandates regarding balance and 
diversity of views represented within the commercial system. Many progressives sought to retain the ban 
on commercial broadcasters’ engagement in political discourse and campaigned against what would become 
the Fairness Doctrine. Despite setbacks, they continued to fight for access to and representation of voices 
and views often excluded within commercial radio. 
 
Meanwhile, commercial broadcasters accrued more political economic power (especially as 
television ascended) and faced less regulatory oversight. Although it would become a valuable tool for 
progressives to fight prejudicial broadcasts, the Fairness Doctrine remained consistent with a corporate 
libertarian approach that privileged content over broader structural concerns and sanctified a lightly 
regulated, commercial media system (Pickard, 2015a). Commercial broadcasters had good reason to 
celebrate, but even the Fairness Doctrine ultimately was too regulatory for them, and they would continue 
to fight it. 
 
The Fairness Doctrine’s Surprising Evolution 
 
The Fairness Doctrine—and how various groups used it—would continue to evolve, sometimes in 
surprising ways. Congress further codified the doctrine in 1959 when it amended the Communications Act’s 
Section 315 to declare that broadcasters must adhere to the “obligation imposed upon them under this Act 
to operate in the public interest and to afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views 
on issues of public importance.” With this legal backing, the Doctrine would become a weapon for Democratic 
operatives and liberal activists to use against right-wing broadcasters espousing racist views (Horwitz, 1997) 
or railing against the Kennedy and Johnson administrations (Friendly, 1975). In 1964, the FCC issued a 
“fairness doctrine primer” for handling controversial issues (FCC, 1964), and in 1967, the FCC strengthened 
the Doctrine by creating more specific editorial rules that guaranteed a “right of reply” for political candidates 
and for individuals or groups whose character was maligned during a broadcast. 
 
These changes helped set the stage for the Fairness Doctrine’s greatest test when a liberal author 
named Fred Cook attempted to use it to respond on air to a personal attack from a radio station in Red Lion, 
Pennsylvania. The station denied him the opportunity, but the FCC and, later, the DC Court of Appeals sided 
with Cook. The case ultimately went to the Supreme Court, and in 1969 the Supreme Court unanimously 
affirmed the Doctrine’s legitimacy in its famous Red Lion decision when it determined that “It is the right of 
the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount” (Red Lion Broadcasting 
Co. v. FCC, 1969). The First Amendment’s purpose, the Court argued, was to preserve a vibrant marketplace 
of ideas rather than to defend broadcasters’ monopolization of the nation’s discourse. Rarely has a positive 
freedom been so clearly articulated within American legal and policy discourse. 
 
The Red Lion decision seemed to sanctify the Fairness Doctrine’s legitimacy, and support for the 
Doctrine remained steady through the 1970s, championed not only by the left but also by some prominent 
figures on the right (Cimaglio, 2016; Saddler, 1985). President Nixon tried to use the Doctrine to his political 
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advantage, and Phyllis Schlafly’s Anti-Equal Rights Amendment campaign relied on it for attaining media 
coverage. She once told the FCC that without the policy, they “couldn’t even have gotten that measly five 
percent” of news coverage. Similarly, conservative media critic Reed Irvine claimed the Doctrine was needed 
to combat “liberal news” (both quoted in Lasar, 2008), and Gary Bauer once warned Reagan that it was the 
only protection ensuring the presence of conservative voices within an otherwise liberal media landscape 
(Zelizer, 2017). However, not all conservatives were supportive, seeing it instead as a weapon to be used 
against them. Heather Hendershot’s (2011) work on the outspoken conservative Christian broadcaster Carl 
McIntire is very instructive on this point. McIntire is reportedly the only broadcaster to lose his license 
(revoked in 1973) directly because of Fairness Doctrine violations, which demonstrated how the Doctrine 
could be deployed to silence conservatives.  
 
The advertising industry also opposed the Doctrine because it could be used to contest advertising 
for tobacco and other controversial products. In 1967, the FCC determined that cigarette advertising 
presented one side of a controversial issue and therefore, according to the Doctrine, stations presenting 
such advertisements must offer free airtime for anti-tobacco positions (Bollinger, 1991). Several progressive 
groups seized this opportunity afforded by the Doctrine and submitted counter-advertising against ads by 
energy companies and, in some cases, succeeded in getting them aired (Niesen, 2013). The FTC even 
proposed balancing commercial messages for sugary foods with counter-messages under the aegis of the 
Doctrine. However, advertisers successfully pressured the FTC to disallow such practices so that applying 
the Doctrine to advertising would never be seriously considered again. 
 
By the 1980s, the tide began to turn in favor of anti–Fairness Doctrine arguments. The first major 
blow was in 1984, when the District of Columbia Circuit Court reexamined the 1959 Congressional 
amendment, which gave the Doctrine legislative backing. In FCC v. League of Women Voters, the Court 
decided in a 2–1 decision (with the two in favor being the well-known conservative judges Antonin Scalia 
and Robert Bork) to say that the Congressional Amendment was not a “binding statutory obligation.” This 
signaled to the FCC that it did not have to enforce the rule. The Reagan-appointed FCC chair, Mark Fowler, 
who gained notoriety for saying that televisions were nothing more than toasters with pictures, was all too 
eager to jettison the Doctrine. 
 
However, significant attempts to save the Fairness Doctrine continued. Democrats responded to 
the Court decision and to Mark Fowler’s stance by advancing a congressional bill that would have legislated 
the Doctrine. The bill passed by a large margin with significant conservative backing, including from 
luminaries like Representative Newt Gingrich, but President Reagan vetoed it. In 1987, the FCC officially 
repealed the Doctrine, despite many conservatives still calling for it to be codified into law. An attempt to 
pass a similar bill in 1991 withered after George H. W. Bush’s veto threat. There were renewed efforts to 
restore the Doctrine after Clinton’s election in 1992, when liberals saw a political opening. However, by that 
point, already several years into the rise of conservative talk radio that followed the rule’s demise, 
conservatives were able to consolidate their unified opposition against the policy, and it would never again 
gain enough traction to be resurrected. 
 
While today’s conservatives typically view the Fairness Doctrine as a kind of bogeyman and use it 
as political code to delegitimate a wide range of regulatory interventions, liberals often now see it as a 
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liability. Although certainly not all—for example, Ralph Nader believes society still suffers from the Doctrine’s 
loss, and we should find a way to revive it (R. Nader, personal communication, 2015)—many progressives 
seek to distance themselves from the Doctrine. Whereas some believe it is too difficult to enforce, others 
see it as a red herring that does not address the underlying structural problems that hinder media diversity, 
such as concentrated corporate ownership and over-commercialization. Liberals also may have succumbed 
to, or perhaps tired of constantly refuting, the conservative refrain that the Doctrine is an example of 
regulatory overreach and antithetical to the First Amendment.  
 
Regardless, the repeal of the Doctrine clearly impacted the politics and discourses around media 
policy. Perlman (2012) noted that the Fairness Doctrine served as an important tool that allowed activists 
to challenge local broadcasters’ programming practices. Thus, its repeal further constrained the ability of 
public interest groups to make their voices heard in an increasingly consolidated media landscape. In 
addition to solidifying a neoliberal market logic in media policy, Perlman observed that one of deregulation’s 
many appeals for both the FCC and broadcasters was its ability to neutralize the viability of media activism. 
At the very least, it mainstreamed a corporate libertarian position of delegitimizing state intervention in 
media markets, a policy orientation that has restructured the U.S. media system in recent decades (Pickard, 
2015a). 
 
Furthermore, the Fairness Doctrine’s repeal also led to dramatic changes in the media landscape 
itself. While Rush Limbaugh’s “don’t hush Rush” campaign to prevent the Doctrine’s reinstatement may have 
exaggerated the relationship, the policy’s absence and the rapid ascendance of similar conservative talk 
radio formats likely are connected. Many scholars and commentators have noted that the Doctrine’s removal 
led to an explosion of predominantly right-wing radio programming formats (Douglas, 2002; Zelizer, 2017). 
As talk radio became more of a political force, it became a vocal source of opposition to the Doctrine. 
Whereas previously, some conservatives saw it as a constraint on the “liberal” networks, they now viewed 
the Doctrine as fundamentally hostile toward conservative politics. 
 
Also significant, talk radio commentators’ ability to mobilize public opinion against the Fairness 
Doctrine demonstrated to conservative activists its utility for whipping up a reliable voting bloc. As such, 
the Doctrine continues to play an important rhetorical role in conservative politics more broadly. Though 
largely abandoned by even its most ardent supporters, the Doctrine in recent years has become an 
archetype of government overreach. Market libertarians have invoked it against even the most benign and 
unrelated media policies, like the Internet safeguard known as network neutrality. Leading libertarian policy 
analyst Adam Thierer (2007) referred to net neutrality as “a Fairness Doctrine for the Internet.” Similarly, 
President Trump tweeted on November 12, 2014, that “Obama’s attack on the internet is another top down 
power grab. Net neutrality is the Fairness Doctrine. Will target conservative media” (Trump, 2014).  
 
Such periodic flare-ups suggest that the Fairness Doctrine will remain alive and well in conservative 
activists’ imaginations and political rhetoric for years to come. Lasar (2009), referring to one wave of 
hysteria as “The Great Fairness Doctrine Panic of 2009,” noted that, despite a few rogue comments from 
Democratic members of Congress (see, e.g., Anderson, 2007), there was near unanimity from progressive 
media reformers that no one wanted to reinstate the Doctrine. Everyone, ranging from President Obama to 
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FCC Commissioner Michael Copps (Eggerton, 2010) to the leading U.S. media reform group Free Press, was 
unequivocal in the desire to see the Fairness Doctrine fade from policy discourse. 
 
Meanwhile, conservatives found in the Fairness Doctrine a popular political issue that resonated 
especially well with their base. In 2007, then-Congressman Mike Pence introduced an amendment to an 
appropriations bill that forbade the FCC from spending any money on Fairness Doctrine enforcement. 
Because the FCC was not enforcing the Doctrine, the amendment passed in a largely symbolic 309–115 
vote. Pence then introduced the Broadcaster Freedom Act to permanently remove the Doctrine from the 
books. After House Speaker Nancy Pelosi blocked the act from coming to a vote, Pence gathered 194 
Republican signatures for a discharge petition, a procedural maneuver that would force a vote on the law. 
 
Ultimately, however, it was the FCC, not Congress, that brought the Fairness Doctrine to its official 
end, and it did so with a touch of final irony. A 2011 policy report (Waldman, 2011) that many media 
reformers had hoped would recommend meaningful regulations to protect public service journalism (Pickard, 
2015b) included among its more tangible proposals a call for striking the Doctrine from the books (even 
though it had been effectively defunct since its 1987 repeal). FCC Chairman Genachowski subsequently 
removed it, along with over 80 other media industry rules, as part of a larger White House executive order 
to review potentially onerous regulations (Boliek, 2011). Thus, 60-plus years after its birth, the Fairness 
Doctrine met a quiet bureaucratic end. 
 
Yet it continues to live on in political discourse and imagination. Alarmist talk of a “stealth” or 
“backdoor” Fairness Doctrine often erupts whenever the FCC mentions concerns about the lack of diversity 
in our media (Perlman, 2012). One such example of this manufactured threat came roaring back in response 
to the FCC’s proposed study on communities’ information needs, which included an analysis of local 
newsrooms’ editorial judgment. A group of Republican members of Congress wrote a letter to FCC Chairman 
Tom Wheeler condemning the report (Sasso, 2013), referring to it in their press release as a “Fairness 
Doctrine 2.0.” This was followed by an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal by Republican FCC Commissioner 
Ajit Pai (2014), who also likened the study’s aims to that of the Fairness Doctrine, suggesting that the FCC 
was once again taking the country “down the same dangerous path.” In response to this pressure, the FCC 
first distanced itself from and then completely disavowed the study (Hattem, 2014). One of the authors of 
the literature review that preceded the study lamented that “To conservative media from Fox News to Rush 
Limbaugh, this was an attempt to reintroduce the now-lapsed Fairness Doctrine and for President Obama 
to take control of America’s newsrooms” (Friedland, 2014, para. 2). Such reactions toward even mildly 
affirmative measures bring implicit power structures into view. 
 
Positive Freedoms’ Threat to Corporate Libertarianism 
 
To understand these reactions against anything that smacks of affirmative media policy requires 
an examination of their underlying normative assumptions. A positive-freedom framework strikes at the 
core of the “corporate libertarian” paradigm (Pickard, 2015a). By deemphasizing individual freedoms and 
property rights, positive freedoms privilege community rights to media and threaten media firms’ corporate 
power. In other words, if positive speech rights like those embodied by the Fairness Doctrine served as the 
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normative foundations for the communicative relationships between individuals, publics, states, and media 
institutions, the privileged position of media firms would be greatly undermined. 
 
This tradition of positive liberties reflected in policy measures—often neglected in standard 
American histories—elevates an ideal of diverse voices and viewpoints in the media system, and it contests 
concentrated media power among corporate actors as much as among governments. This position seeks to 
protect collective rights held by publics and audiences as much as individual persons or corporations as 
speakers. And it is skeptical as to whether the unfettered free market can ever fully provide for positive 
freedoms (Pickard, 2016). Therefore, protecting such rights often requires government intervention, which 
is antithetical to market libertarianism.  
 
In this context, specific policy debates become proxies for broader ideological struggles. Charles 
Siepmann made similar observations decades after the Mayflower hearings when he was called by Congress 
to comment on attacks against the Fairness Doctrine. Siepmann observed that “potshots” against the 
Doctrine “constitute a mere diversionary plot” for those who are “out for bigger game” (Siepmann, 1968, p. 
1). Namely, broadcasters wanted to delegitimate the FCC’s regulatory over programming entirely. Likewise, 
market libertarians who invoke the Doctrine today are trying to cripple the FCC’s ability to regulate with any 
affirmative commitment to the public interest.  
 
Despite such ideological constraints, addressing media-related challenges facing Americans today—
from the digital divide, to media concentration, to the lack of diverse news media—requires proactive policy 
interventions in response to the market’s failure to provide high-quality news and information via a 
universally accessible media system. It also requires permitting government regulatory agencies like the 
FCC to periodically collect and study data on such problems. Most of all, it necessitates new normative 
foundations for affirmative media policies founded on positive freedoms. 
 
Beyond the Fairness Doctrine 
 
This article recontextualizes and historicizes the Fairness Doctrine, one of the most controversial 
regulations ever adopted by the FCC. As a concession to broadcasters who balked at the more stringent 
Mayflower Doctrine, the Fairness Doctrine actually marked a form of deregulation. But it also served as a 
consolation to progressive media reformers. In the ensuing decades, different actors, both liberal and 
conservative, would appropriate the Doctrine in different ways. 
 
While this study has offered an overview of the Fairness Doctrine’s surprising evolution, more 
research is needed to account for its long historical arc. In particular, a more detailed account of the rule’s 
appropriation by different groups after its adoption in 1949 would be useful, as would an examination of 
how subsequent attempts to eliminate the rule in the 1970s were part of a broader trend toward 
deregulation. Future work may also contextualize the Doctrine’s high-water mark in the 1960s and 1970s 
within a more interventionist period of broadcast regulation that included progressive policies such as 
ascertainment requirements, equal employment opportunity rules, Fin-Syn, and the Prime Time Access 
Rules. 
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A historical irony emerging from this narrative is that a rule once interpreted as a significant victory 
by the NAB later became vilified by broadcasters and market libertarians. And although it had been 
championed by many conservative leaders, the policy became so stigmatized over time that even many 
liberal politicians took pains to distance themselves from it, culminating in a Democratic-appointed FCC chair 
proudly announcing its official removal. The gradual mainstreaming of this stigmatization is arguably one of 
the more interesting dramas in the history of American media policy.  
 
Although officially killing the Fairness Doctrine was ostensibly an attempt to remove “unnecessary 
regulations,” it validates the contention that government has no legitimate role in regulating media markets 
and protecting positive freedoms. Before allowing this normative foundation to further crystallize, American 
society should have a public conversation about the kind of media system a democracy requires. In its 30-
year retreat from policies that constrain corporate power over media, the FCC has mandated increasingly 
weaker obligations that broadcasters must fulfill to maintain their immense monopoly privileges. This more 
recent round of deregulation—or rather, de facto regulation by oligopolistic markets—provides yet more 
evidence of the gradual shrinkage of government advocacy on the public’s behalf. Ideally, the FCC would 
not be allowed to abdicate responsibility for dealing with many of the communication problems facing society 
today, including lack of media diversity and the loss of journalism. 
 
Despite being unceremoniously thrown out by a purportedly liberal-leaning FCC, the Fairness 
Doctrine’s removal could be viewed as a shrewd maneuver that puts to rest what had become a distraction 
from more important concerns. After all, many media reformers have long seen the Doctrine as an imperfect 
solution to a structural problem—namely, that a highly concentrated, commercialized media system has 
little incentive to serve the public interest (see, e.g., Lloyd, 2007). But the Doctrine’s removal has not been 
accompanied by the development of less problematic media policies designed to proactively address ongoing 
problems. Adequately funding robust and independent public alternatives to the commercial media system—
a commonsensical practice for most leading democracies—is probably a more effective strategy to 
encourage diverse voices. 
 
The 2016 elections brought to the fore a number of media-related pathologies, including a 
proliferation of misinformation and imbalanced news coverage. Whereas some of these problems require 
aggressive structural reform, lighter content-related policy interventions could also be useful, including bans 
on deceptive political advertising. Other leading democracies have found ways to help mitigate these 
problems. For example, Cushion (2016) noted that British broadcasters must abide by strict “due 
impartiality” rules while covering politics and that these requirements encourage news organizations to be 
sensitive toward balance in their coverage. He observed, “The American approach to election reporting is 
shaped almost entirely by the pursuit of commercial news values, rather than a journalistic attempt to 
balance party perspectives and the views of competing candidates” (para. 13).  This commitment to positive 
freedoms—the assumption that audience members and news consumers should have access to a broad 
range of views in their media—is largely missing from contemporary policy discourse. 
 
Discursive constructions of the Fairness Doctrine will likely continue to evolve. America’s history of 
red-baiting and other fear-mongering tactics suggests that a threat’s nonexistence does not prevent its 
invocation as a cynical ploy to galvanize a political bloc. Despite being forever struck from the books, the 
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Doctrine still reemerges in the discourse at frequent intervals. By abolishing the Doctrine, liberals may have 
hoped to take a powerful arrow out of conservatives’ rhetorical quiver, but they did so at the cost of 
enshrining a narrative that media are governed best by market forces. After continued efforts to condemn 
the FCC and Congress for perceived overregulation, market libertarians’ policy vision has been 
mainstreamed and normalized. This “discursive capture” has had many negative consequences for the 
American media system (Pickard, 2015b). Examining the Fairness Doctrine’s long history shows how this 
happened, and how far American society has strayed from a media system founded on positive freedoms. 
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